Mu chos teó ri cos han pres ta do su aten ción a la pre gun ta so bre si el aná -li sis fi lo só fi co mo ral men te neu tral del con cep to 'de re cho' es un pro yec to sos te ni ble. En cam bio, se ha pres ta do me nos aten ción a dis cu tir si el enfo que me to do ló gi co ba sa do en des crip cio nes y ex pli ca cio nes mo ral men te neu tra les, en lu gar del aná li sis fi lo só fi co, es un pro yec to de fen di ble. Mi ob je ti vo prin ci pal en este ar tícu lo es ar gu men tar que, si bien la la bor teó ri ca des crip ti va/ex pli ca ti va es un pro yec to ló gi ca men te po si ble, no es, sin em bar go, de fen di ble. Yo sos ten go que no hay ra zón para ais lar la labor teó ri co-ju rí di ca de los ar gu men tos mo ra les. Por el con tra rio, es desea ble que los teó ri cos del de re cho em pleen con si de ra cio nes mo ra les, de - bi do a que es sólo a tra vés de ar gu men tos mo ra les como po de mos res pon der las pre gun tas que nos preo cu pan en re la ción con el de re cho.
INTRODUCTION
The sub set of the phi los o phy of law that con cerns le gal 'meth od ol ogy' ad dresses ques tions about the con cept and na ture of law. Ques tions about the con cept of law are those about the mean ing and ref er ence of the term 'law'. They are ques tions that ob tain at the lin guis tic level. Ques tions about the na ture of law con cern the prop er ties of the phenom e non to which the term 'law' ap plies. These two in ves tiga tions in ter sect: for ex am ple, if we have an an swer to the ques tion about the na ture of law, that is, if we know the core or es sen tial prop er ties of the phe nom e non, we also know that the term 'law' re fers to any thing with these proper ties. If we have an an swer to the ques tion of def i ni tion at the lin guis tic level, we know that the term cor rectly ap plies to any phenomenon in the world that satisfies that definition.
Meth od olog i cal le gal pos i tiv ism is the idea that the o riz ing about the na ture and con cept of law is and should be morally-neu tral (Perry 2000, 311) . It claims that the o riz ing about the con cept of law (about what the word 'law' means) should be an ex er cise in mor ally-neu tral philo soph i cal anal y sis and the o riz ing about the na ture of law as a so cial phe nom e non should be a mor ally-neu tral pro cess of descrip tion and ex pla na tion. Schol ars have given at ten tion to the ques tion of whether mor ally-neu tral philo soph i cal analy sis of the con cept 'law' is a sus tain able pro ject. For instance, Brian Leiter in vokes Quine's re jec tion of the an alytic-syn thetic dis tinc tion to ar gue that philo soph i cal anal y sis is bank rupt (Leiter 2003) . Liam Murphy ar gues that in trac ta ble dis agree ment is rife within de bates over the philo soph i cal anal y sis of the con cept of law and hence the 53 pro ject of con cep tual anal y sis is point less (Murphy 2005 and . Less at ten tion has been given how ever to whether the meth od olog i cal ap proach that re lies on morally-neu tral de scrip tion and ex pla na tion, rather than on philo soph i cal anal y sis, is a de fen si ble pro ject. My pri mary goal in this pa per is to ar gue that it is not de fen si ble. I claim that there is no rea son to in su late le gal the ory from moral ar gu ments, and hence that it is per mis si ble for le gal the o rists to em ploy moral con sid er ations. Wil Waluchow claims that al low ing moral eval u a tion into the o riz ing is 'wish ful think ing' or 'dis guis ing re al ity be hind a sweet coating of moral ra tio nal iza tion' (Waluchow 1994, 17) . In this paper I embrace wishful thinking. I argue that legal theory should employ moral considerations to answer questions we care about.
The po si tion that le gal the o riz ing should em ploy moral eval u a tion cor re sponds to the de nial of meth od olog i cal pos itiv ism. How ever there are two pos si ble strat e gies for de nying meth od olog i cal pos i tiv ism, only one of which I adopt here. The first strat egy em ploys what I call the ne ces sity claim, the po si tion that moral eval u a tion is a con cep tu ally nec es sary el e ment of le gal the ory be cause the o riz ing ei ther about so cial prac tices in gen eral or law in par tic u lar (concep tu ally) re quires moral and po lit i cal ar gu ment. I do not en dorse this po si tion here, and in deed, for rea sons de veloped in the first and sec ond sec tions, I think it is in cor rect. Rather, I de fend the de sir abil ity claim, the po si tion that it is de sir able for le gal the o rists to em ploy moral con sid er ations be cause it is only through moral ar gu ment that we can answer im por tant ques tions we care about with re spect to law. If it is desirable for the o rists to em ploy moral con sid erations, moral con sid er ations should not be kept out of the oriz ing, and hence meth od olog i cal pos i tiv ism is in cor rect.
I de velop the ar gu ment of the pa per in three sec tions. In sec tion I, I fo cus on philo soph i cal anal y sis and ar gue for what I term con cep tual anal y sis plu ral ism. I first elab o rate three pos si ble ap proaches to con cep tual anal y sis for terms 54 that re fer to so cial kinds. 1 Two of these in qui ries are usually mor ally-neu tral and hence they are com pat i ble with meth od olog i cal pos i tiv ism (the third type of in quiry may em ploy moral con sid er ations). I then ar gue for con cep tual anal y sis plu ral ism: the dif fer ent ap proaches to con cep tual anal y sis are all log i cally pos si ble pro ce dures that in some cases yield dif fer ent and in com pat i ble con cepts. Thus, concep tual anal y sis plu ral ism im plies that the ne ces sity claim is false be cause cer tain log i cally pos si ble the o ret i cal strat egies do not em ploy moral con sid er ations. In sec tion II, I focus on the po si tion that le gal the o riz ing is mor ally-neu tral de scrip tive/ex plan a tory the o riz ing about the so cial phenom e non 'law'. I agree with pro po nents of de scrip tive/explan a tory the o riz ing that their po si tion is log i cally pos si ble; hence their po si tion im plies that the ne ces sity claim is false. Their po si tion also im plic itly pro vides sup port for concep tual anal y sis plu ral ism. How ever, as I go on to ar gue in sec tion III, pro po nents of de scrip tive/ex plan a tory the o riz ing have not ruled out the de sir abil ity claim. Sec tion III sketches and re buts four pos si ble pre lim i nary ar gu ments against the de sir abil ity claim. I con clude that the de sir abil ity claim is de fen si ble, and that meth od olog i cal pos i tiv ism should be re jected. 2 I am grate ful to Ve ron ica Ro dri guez-Blanco for point ing out there is a stron ger nor ma tive po si tion that one could adopt, namely that the strategy that al lows moral con sid er ations to be em ployed in le gal the o riz ing has nor ma tive pri or ity over the mor ally-neu tral strat e gies. Hence in some cases it would be not just de sir able but mor ally re quired for a the o rist to em ploy moral con sid er ations when the o riz ing about law. Al though I believe this stron ger po si tion is prob a bly cor rect, I will not be pur su ing it here.
'What is mar riage?' or in deed 'What is law?'? One com mon philo soph i cal strat egy is to in ves ti gate what is meant by the term 'X'. This strat egy, that of con cep tual anal y sis, op er ates at the lin guis tic level to an swer ques tions about the se mantic prop er ties of the term 'X'. What does 'X' mean? What does 'X' re fer to? Sally Haslanger has iden ti fied three pos sible modes of con cep tual anal y sis for terms that re fer to social kinds (Haslanger 2000 (Haslanger , 2005 . The first is what she calls a con cep tual in quiry that 'looks to a pri ori meth ods such as in tro spec tion for an an swer' (Haslanger 2005, 12) . This ap proach cor re sponds to tra di tional philo soph i cal anal y sis. It is a pro cess of re flect ing on, sift ing and or ga nizing the in tu itions as so ci ated with a term and the cases to which the term in tu itively ap plies. The re sult of this process is typ i cally an anal y sis of a con cept in which nec es sary and suf fi cient con di tions for the ap pli ca tion of the con cept are iden ti fied. For ex am ple, re flect ing on the in tu itions asso ci ated with the con cept 'wa ter' yields the con clu sion that 'wa ter' means 'po ta ble, col or less, odor less liq uid found in rivers and lakes'. The term 'wa ter' is cor rectly ap plied therefore if and only if it is ap plied to the stuff in the world that sat is fies this de scrip tion. Since the first kind of in quiry relies on in tu itions, it leads to a con cept that is im plicit in com mon un der stand ing and ac tual us age. It leads to a 'man i fest' con cept, a con cept that we have in mind (Haslanger 2005) .
Ste phen Perry is an ex am ple of a le gal the o rist who adopts an ac count of philo soph i cal anal y sis that yields the equiv a lent of a man i fest con cept:
Typ i cally, the philo soph i cal anal y sis of a con cept at tempts to make ex plicit what the the o rist claims is in some sense already im plicit in our com mon un der stand ing. This can take the form of draw ing at ten tion to prop o si tions that the the orist ar gues are ei ther im plicit pre sup posed or nec es sar ily entailed… [or] of an at tempt to show that the con cept is equiv alent…to some other con cept... [or] …it will amount to a more 56 am bi tious at tempt to re duce one con cept to a log i cal con fig ura tion of oth ers… (Perry 2000, 333) . On Perry's ac count, the com mon un der stand ing re flected in ac tual us age is a kind of moral un der stand ing. He argues that con cep tual anal y sis of nor ma tive con cepts like those of au thor ity and le gal ob li ga tion, as well the con cept of law it self, nec es sar ily em ploys moral eval u a tion. Par tic ipants in le gal prac tices are prac ti cal rea son ers who ex pect the prac tice to give them rea sons for ac tion that they would not oth er wise have: 'the idea is to make moral sense of the prac tice by show ing peo ple why and un der what cir cumstances they might have rea son to com ply with it' (Perry 2000, 350) . Elu ci dat ing a con cept with this aim in mind requires pro vid ing a moral jus ti fi ca tion of the con cept because, for in stance, if there is no moral jus ti fi ca tion of the con cept of le gal ob li ga tion, par tic i pants in le gal prac tice will have no rea son to obey the law. For Perry, the o rists an a lyzing nor ma tive con cepts such as law are con cep tu ally required to em ploy moral con sid er ations. 3 The con cep tual in quiry just de scribed that em ploys in tuitions to gen er ate a man i fest con cept should be dis tinguished from a sec ond type of in quiry, in which we ask 'what kinds (if any) our…vo cab u lary tracks. The task is to de velop po ten tially more ac cu rate con cepts through care ful con sid er ation of the phe nom ena, usu ally re ly ing on em pir ical or quasi-em pir i cal meth ods' (Haslanger 2005, 12) . This in quiry has its roots in the nat u ral kind externalism first elab o rated by Hil ary Putnam (1973) . The mean ings of nat ural kind terms, such as 'gold' or 'wa ter' are not given by the in tu itions we as so ci ate with our con cepts when we re flect 57 on them -in tu itions such as that wa ter is a col or less, odorless, po ta ble liq uid-but rather by fea tures of the phys i cal stuff that we use the term 'wa ter' to track. Haslanger comments that 'sci en tific essentialists and naturalizers… start by iden ti fy ing par a digm cases… and then draw on em pir i cal (or quasi-em pir i cal) re search to ex pli cate the rel e vant kind to which the par a digms be long ' (2005, 12) . It is im por tant how ever that the externalist model is not lim ited to ar tic ulat ing con cepts that pick out nat u ral or bi o log i cal kinds: 'Externalism is an op tion when ever there are rel a tively objec tive types' (Haslanger 2005, 18) . For in stance, the so cial externalism de fended Ty ler Burge ex tends externalism to con cepts whose con tents are in di vid u ated by fea tures of the so cial en vi ron ment (Burge 1979 (Mercier 2007, 18) . A com mu nity of ex perts works out, through an ex am i na tion of the ca non i cal ref er ents, the nature of the par a digm. Chem ists tell us that the mo lec u lar struc ture of wa ter is H2O and hence the con tent of the concept of wa ter is H2O. Thus, al though XYZ may have the same su per fi cial fea tures as wa ter, it does fall into the water-kind. In the same way, rheumatologists tell us that arthri tis is a con di tion of the joints and not a gen er al ized condi tion, and hence 'ar thri tis' im plies 'con di tion of the joints.' Thus, on the de scrip tive strat egy, the cor rect un der standing of con cepts is de liv ered by ex perts' em pir i cal in ves ti gation of the na ture of the kind to which the con cept re fers. The mean ing of so cial con cepts is fixed not by con ven tional (or di nary) us age but rather by na ture of the kind that is described by ex perts. 4 Even if there is as yet no stan dard linguis tic us age agreed on among ex perts, still the de scrip tive pro ject in ves ti gat ing our op er a tive con cept of so cial kinds or types is a pos si ble one. Its start ing point is the par a digm that fixes (by ostension) the ref er ence of the term 'law'. On this de scrip tive ac count, con cep tual anal y sis there fore does not nec es sar ily track what we have in mind or what can be ar tic u lated through an ex am i na tion of com mon un derstand ing. 5 'Wa ter' means 'H2O' even if no one knows that it does.
Nicos Stavropoulos is an ex am ple of a le gal the o rist who adopts the de scrip tive in quiry to elu ci date the mean ing of le gal terms. Stavropoulos' ar gu ment for the ob jec tiv ity of legal prop o si tions em ploys Burge's so cial externalism (Sta-59 IN PRAISE OF WISHFUL THINKING 4 Coleman and Simchen make an in ter est ing ar gu ment that I can not ex am ine in de tail here. They pro pose that Putnam's externalism can be ex tended to all com mon nouns like 'chair' and 'pen cil'. On their view, 'law' is anal o gous to 'chair' or 'pen cil' not to nat u ral kind terms like 'gold' or 'wa ter'. The key dif fer ence be tween 'chair' and 'pen cil' on the one hand and nat u ral kind terms on the other is that the for mer are not 'lin guis tically def er en tial' -i.e. they do not 'ex hibit a di vi sion of lin guis tic la bour' which means that us ers of terms like 'chair' and 'pen cil' do not need to defer to ex perts to tell them what counts as be ing in the ex ten sion of the terms-. Coleman and Simchen ar gue that 'law' is not lin guis ti cally def eren tial due in part to 'a per ceived lack of agree ment among juris pru dents [which con sti tutes] a key fac tor as to why the ex ten sion of "law" is not fixed by re li ance on ju ris pru den tial ex per tise ' (2003, 22) . 5 An other ex am ple: 'Be ing a law yer is dif fer ent from be ing thought to be a law yer… Or di nary speak ers are com pe tent with the word "law yer" because most of the peo ple whom we think of as law yers ac tu ally are. But none of what an or di nary speaker need know to use 'law yer' com pe tently de ter mines the in di vid u a tion con di tions for be ing a law yer; those are deter mined by Bar ex ams, as these are de ter mined by those most in formed about what one must know to be a law yer' (Mercier 2007). vropoulos 1996). He pres ents his view as an alternative to the 'criterial se man tics' that he at trib utes to Hart (Stavropoulos 2000, 81-5) . Criterial se man tics is a ver sion of tra di tional con cep tual in quiry. How ever, Stavropoulos endorses con cep tual anal y sis on the Burge model in which 'deep' con cepts are em ployed. Anal y sis does not at tempt to elu ci date ac tual us age at all be cause 'the stan dard to which ac tual us age is re spon si ble is given by a pro jec tion be yond ac tual us age it self' (Stavropoulos 2000, 81) . 6 The third pos si ble cat e gory of in quiry is an 'ameliorative' in quiry: 'What is the point of hav ing the con cept in question… What con cept (if any) would do the work best?' (Haslanger 2005, 12-3) . This pro ject can be con ceived as a kind of instrumentalism: it is the pro ject of pos it ing a concept to achieve cer tain the o ret i cal pur poses (Murphy 2008). For ex am ple, an ameliorative in quiry could en gage in moral or other eval u a tion of the pur pose of the prac tice to which the con cept re fers with the aim of re fin ing and im prov ing the con cept so that it best serves the pur pose of the practice. In le gal the ory, Ron ald Dworkin's no tion of con structive in ter pre ta tion ex em pli fies this ap proach (Dworkin 1986) . The first step in the pro cess of con struc tive in ter preta tion is anal o gous to the iden ti fi ca tion of par a digms on the de scrip tive ap proach. Dworkin pro poses that, at the preinterpretive stage, 'we have no dif fi culty iden ti fy ing collec tively the prac tices that count as le gal prac tices in our own cul ture. We have leg is la tures and courts and ad min istra tive agen cies and bod ies and the de ci sions these in sti tutions make are re ported in a ca non i cal way ' (Dworkin 1986, 91) . At the sec ond, in ter pre tive, stage, sub stan tive an swers to ques tions about the pur pose of the so cial prac tice are artic u lated and de fended. Dworkin de scribes the 'in ter pre tive at ti tude' of par tic i pants in rule-gov erned so cial prac tices: first, the prac tice 'does not sim ply ex ist but has value…it serves some in ter est or pur pose or en forces some prin ci ple'; 60 sec ondly, the rules of the prac tice are taken by the par tic ipants as 'sen si tive to its point…: Peo ple now try to im pose mean ing on the in sti tu tion -to see it in its best light-and then to re struc ture it in the light of that mean ing' (Dworkin 1986, 47 ). Dworkin's con cept of law -'law as in teg rity' -is the re sult nei ther of a pri ori re flec tion on in tu itions nor of de scrip tive the o riz ing about the na ture of a par a digm. Rather, it is a the o ret i cal posit that is in tro duced be cause it pro motes what Dworkin takes to be the pur pose of the social prac tice of law, namely, to pro vide a moral jus ti fi ca tion of co er cive le gal in sti tu tions. On Dworkin's ac count, therefore, an ameliorative strat egy yields a tar get (or in ter pre tive) concept: the concept of law as integrity.
I have iden ti fied three strat e gies of con cep tual anal y sis for con cepts that re fer to so cial kinds. These dif fer ent strate gies help to cat e go rize the log i cal space of le gal meth od ol ogies, be cause pro po nents of dif fer ent le gal meth od ol o gies adopt one or other of the three strat e gies. In the re main der of the sec tion, I elab o rate a kind of plu ral ism about con ceptual anal y sis for a par tic u lar sub set of so cial kind con cepts, those that re fer to so cial prac tices. So cial kind con cepts com prise a di verse set, and not all are suf fi ciently anal ogous to law to make ad e quate il lus tra tions for our purposes. 'Ar thri tis' re fers to an ob jec tive so cial type but not one that is rel e vantly sim i lar to law. A dis tinc tive fea ture of the so cial kinds that con cern us here is that they are comprised of prac tices that are used by the par tic i pants in the prac tices 'to un der stand them selves': Jo seph Raz writes that 'it is a ma jor task of le gal the ory to ad vance our un derstand ing of so ci ety by help ing us to un der stand how peo ple un der stand them selves' (Raz 1994, 237) . So cial prac tices are com prised of ex plicit and tacit rules that or ga nize and guide hu man so cial be hav ior. The o rists of these prac tices are en gaged in an at tempt to 'ad vance our un der stand ing of our selves' by ad vanc ing our un der stand ing of the rel e vant as pects of hu man be hav ior. For ex am ple, the o rists of re li -gion ex pli cate the set of ex plicit and tacit rules that gov ern hu man re li gious be hav ior. 7 Con cep tual anal y sis plu ral ism has two com po nents. The first is that there are dif fer ent (and in com pat i ble) yet log ically pos si ble con cepts of law. One way of char ac ter iz ing the three strat e gies iden ti fied above is to say that they are merely epistemological in qui ries or de ci sion pro ce dures, that is, that they are dif fer ent ap proaches a the o rist might em ploy to find out about the (cor rect) con cept of law. Concep tual anal y sis plu ral ism is not merely epistemological how ever. It claims that each strat egy is log i cally pos si ble for the anal y sis of con cepts that re fer to so cial prac tices. None should be adopted as a mat ter of ne ces sity or ex cluded from log i cal space as a mat ter of ne ces sity. All give rea sonable an swers to the ques tion: 'What is our con cept of law?' The man i fest con cept cor re sponds to the con cept we take our selves to have; the op er a tive con cept picks out the practices in the world that our vo cab u lary tracks, and the ameliorative con cept cor re sponds to the nor ma tive standard to which our prac tice is im plic itly com mit ted. When the dif fer ent in qui ries de liver dif fer ent and in com pat i ble con cepts of law, each is a log i cally de fen si ble con cept. It follows there fore that there are several different concepts of law and genuine plu ral ism -not merely epistemological plu ral ism-ob tains.
A sec ond fea ture of plu ral ism is that be cause all three inqui ries are log i cally pos si ble ways of an swer ing the question, 'What is our con cept of law?', con flicts can arise both within the dif fer ent in qui ries and be tween them. As many have pointed out, the man i fest con cept may be in de ter minate or it may con flict with the op er a tive or tar get con cepts. The op er a tive con cept may also be in de ter mi nate or may 62 NATALIE STOLJAR 7 There is wide spread agree ment that the task of le gal the ory is to advance our un der stand ing of how we un der stand our own le gal prac tice. Al though Perry and Dick son adopt very dif fer ent meth od ol o gies of law, the pas sage from Raz is quoted ap prov ingly by both au thors (Perry 2000, 348; Dick son 2001, 40) .
con flict with the tar get con cept, and so forth. When such indeterminacies or con flicts arise, it will be de sir able or even nor ma tively re quired to em ploy a dif fer ent strat egy. 8 For in stance, re flec tion about the op er a tive con cept may be de sir able to dis am bigu ate the man i fest con cept; or re flection on the tar get con cept may be re quired to re solve conflicts be tween the man i fest and the op er a tive con cepts. This pro cess may not fully re solve indeterminacies but it is a valu able method of an swer ing questions we care about and providing a more fully fleshed-out account of the concept.
Let me briefly elab o rate con cep tual anal y sis plu ral ism us ing an other con cept that picks out a so cial prac tice, the con cept of mar riage. What is mar riage? Is same sex marriage re ally mar riage? Or does the mean ing of 'mar riage' imply that the term 'same sex mar riage' is a mis no mer or even a con tra dic tion? Re flec tions on the in tu itions im plicit in our com mon un der stand ing or day-to-day us age of 'mar riage' may re veal that 'mar riage' ap plies only to op po site sex unions, never to same sex un ions. Con sider an ar gu ment to this ef fect that I adapt from a brief to Ca na dian courts (Stainton 2001). 9 Our com mon un der stand ing of the concept of mar riage is in formed by the his tory of the in sti tu tion of mar riage. The rel e vant his tory -the his tory that informs our con cept-is Judeo-Chris tian re li gious his tory in which mar riage is nec es sar ily an op po site sex un ion. Since this his tory is im plicit in ac tual us age and com mon un derstand ing, it is also im plicit that a core or nec es sary feature of our manifest concept of marriage is that it is an opposite sex union.
How ever the man i fest con cept just out lined may not corre spond to the op er a tive con cept of mar riage, the con cept of 63 IN PRAISE OF WISHFUL THINKING 8 As noted above (n. 2), Ve ron ica Ro dri guez-Blanco sug gested the possi bil ity that a strat egy may be not only de sir able but nor ma tively required. Al though I do not have space in this pa per to pur sue an ar gu ment along these lines, it is plau si ble that in some cases a par tic u lar con ceptual in quiry may have nor ma tive pri or ity over oth ers.
9 See Mercier (2007, 4) for a sum mary of Stainton's ar gu ment.
the phe nom e non that ac tual vo cab u lary tracks. What are the prop er ties of the kind to which the par a digms of marriage be long? (Mercier 2007, 18) . Re call that our best epistemological route to the na ture of the kind is the un derstand ing of ex perts. How ever, the an swer to the ques tion of which fea tures are es sen tial to mar riage will dif fer ac cording to which ex perts on mar riage we con sult: Ro man Cath olic theo lo gians may have one an swer, and Is lamic re li gious au thor i ties an other. Hence there are dif fer ent op er a tive con cepts of mar riage. None of the re li gious op er a tive concepts how ever cor re spond to the con cept we are seek ing: in a sec u lar so ci ety, In the ab sence of a stan dard us age of ex perts in the case of a so cial kind con cept like 'mar riage' we (or par lia ments and courts) need to em ploy an ameliorative strat egy. What is the (sec u lar) point of the in sti tu tion of mar riage? What is the pur pose of talk ing about cer tain kinds of so cial arrange ments as mar riages? Is mar riage about pro mot ing pro cre ation and 'tra di tional' fam ily val ues, or al ter na tively is it about re spect for per sons' rights to iden tify their in timate re la tion ships as mar riages and have them rec og nized as such by civil so ci ety? An an swer to the ameliorative inquiry is im por tant be cause (pace Stainton) the man i fest con cept will change over time and there will be more than one op er a tive con cept. More over 'in prac tice it is dif fi cult to keep the three strat e gies en tirely dis tinct' (Haslanger 2005, 13) . Has the man i fest con cept of mar riage changed in Canada due in part to the word 'mar riage' be ing used op er atively since 2005 to re fer to same-sex cou ples? Does our sec u lar or re li gious op er a tive con cept im plic itly im port an 64 ac count of the purpose of talking about marriage as a particular type of social arrangement?
If I am right that there are three strat e gies of con cep tual anal y sis, and these three strat e gies can be used to an a lyze the con cept of law, then no sin gle strat egy is nec es sary for con cep tual anal y sis. Meth od olog i cal pos i tiv ism as ex em plified in the mor ally-neu tral con cep tual and de scrip tive strate gies is log i cally pos si ble. Thus, one can not adopt the neces sity claim; one can not ar gue against meth od olog i cal pos i tiv ism by pro pos ing that moral eval u a tion is a logically necessary element in legal theorizing.
II. THE DESCRIPTIVE/EXPLANATORY METHODOLOGY
A prom i nent form of de scrip tive ap proach within the meth od ol ogy of law -the de scrip tive/ex plan a tory ap proach de fended by Julie Dick son (2001 and 2004)-does not cor respond di rectly to Haslanger's de scrip tive strat egy. The three strat e gies of con cep tual anal y sis iden ti fied in the last section op er ate at the lin guis tic level. For in stance, the de scriptive ap proach that re lies on se man tic externalism aims to elu ci date the mean ing and ref er ence of the term 'law' by inves ti gat ing the na ture of the phe nom e non to which the term re fers. Dick son and oth ers ad vo cate an al ter na tive de scriptive meth od ol ogy claim ing that the task is to pro vide, not a philo soph i cal anal y sis of the con cept or lin guis tic item 'law,' but rather an ex pla na tion of the so cial phe nom e non of law. For ex am ple, Wil Waluchow pro poses that the o riz ing about law is anal o gous to sci en tific the o riz ing that is 'guided by meta-the o ret i cal-evaluative judg ments, (partly) moral judgments as to what is im por tant to high light as dis tinc tive about law as a so cial phe nom e non, and the de sire to avoid mak ing le gal par tic i pants look stu pid [a prin ci ple of charity]' (Waluchow 1994, 27) . Dick son pro poses that the goal of le gal the o riz ing is to ar tic u late an 'explanatorily ad e quate' ac count of the phe nom e non of the mod ern le gal sys tem. The in quiry is mor ally-neu tral be cause it does not require the the o rist to en gage in di rect moral eval u a tion of the phenom e non that is be ing de scribed. Brian Leiter also claims that mor ally-neu tral de scrip tive the o riz ing about law is pos si ble. He dis tin guishes be tween epistemic val ues and moral val ues. The for mer com prise val ues 'we as pire to in the ory con struc tion and the ory choice: ev i den tiary ad equacy…, sim plic ity,… ex plan a tory consilience, and so forth' whereas the lat ter 'bear on the ques tions of prac ti cal rea sonable ness ' (2003, 34-5) Ac cord ing to Leiter, the lat ter set of val ues is not re quired for the ory-con struc tion: 'De scrip tive ju ris pru dence says that epistemic norms, alone, suf fice to de mar cate le gal phe nom ena for pur poses of ju ris pru den tial in quiry ' (2003, 35) .
The de scrip tive/ex plan a tory pro ject just de scribed does not take it self to be en gag ing in con cep tual anal y sis or offer ing an ac count of the mean ing of the term 'law'. How ever it does pro vide an an swer to the ques tion at the lin guis tic level of what the term 'law' means. Re call that, when a concept re fers to an ob jec tive type, the 'mean ing is de ter mined by ostension of par a digms…to gether with an im plicit ex tension to things of the same type as the par a digm' (Haslanger 2005, 18) . The de scrip tive/ex plan a tory ac count must also as sume that there is some pretheoretic con sen sus about what we are the o riz ing about. It must as sume a par a digm, stan dard case or ca non i cal ref er ent of 'law'. Once a par adigm has been iden ti fied, de scrip tive/ex plan a tory the o riz ing about the em pir i cal data of the par a digm de liv ers the core or es sen tial fea tures of the par a digm and hence the nec essary con di tions for count ing as a mem ber of the same kind. The term 'law' is cor rectly applied to whatever in the world instantiates the essential features of the kind.
Let me fo cus here on Dick son's de scrip tive/ex plan a tory pro ject. For Dick son, there is no such thing as 'pure' descriptivism:
I share the view that all the o rists, no mat ter the sub ject matter of their the o ries, must make value judg ments of a cer tain kind and that these value judg ments are re quired sim ply in 66 vir tue of the na ture of the o ret i cal ac counts; namely, that they at tempt to con struct co gent and struc tured ex pla nations that can as sist oth ers in un der stand ing as fully as possi ble the phe nom ena un der con sid er ation… I term these kinds of value judg ments 'purely metatheoretical' value judgments and in clude sim plic ity, clar ity, el e gance, com pre hensive ness, and co her ence among the vir tues that any success ful the ory at tempts to live up to (2004, 135) .
A the o rist does not 'merely pas sively re cord and re produce the pass ing le gal scene, hence not pro vid ing an elu cida tion or anal y sis of as pects of law at all ' (2004, 132) . 10 Rather, a the o rist at tempts to 'con struct co gent and structured ex pla na tions.' In so do ing, she must em ploy evaluative judg ments in three do mains: in the use of meta-the o ret i cal val ues, in se lect ing what is of sig nif i cance to be ex plained, and be cause the data to be ex plained is evaluative data and in cludes peo ple's moral at ti tudes. Dickson writes that 'any explanatorily ad e quate le gal the ory must, in eval u at ing which of law's fea tures are the most impor tant and sig nif i cant to ex plain, be suf fi ciently sen si tive to, or take ad e quate ac count of, what is re garded as im portant or sig nif i cant, good or bad about the law, by those whose be liefs, at ti tudes, be hav iour, etc. are un der con sid eration' (Dick son 2001, 43) . Since it em ploys val ues in the three do mains, Dick son calls the kind of the o riz ing she has in mind 'in di rectly evaluative'. The key ques tion is whether le gal the o rists can avoid in tro duc ing a mor ally evaluative com po nent in con struct ing such ex pla na tions. Dick son acknowl edges that law is a her me neu tic prac tice and hence, 67 IN PRAISE OF WISHFUL THINKING 10 Dick son sug gests that Perry at trib utes this im plau si ble con cep tion of descriptivism to Hart, and hence that in critiquing Hart, he is at tack ing a 'straw man' (Dick son 2004, 133) . It is true that Perry does not think Hart can plau si bly be said to be en gag ing in a de scrip tive/ex plan a tory enter prise. But this is not be cause he at trib utes the im plau si ble con cep tion to Hart. Rather, ac cord ing to Perry, there is no ev i dence that Hart does in fact the o rize about the le gal data em ploy ing the metatheoretic val ues that Dick son ad vo cates (Perry 2000, 321) .
fol low ing Raz, that a suc cess ful le gal the ory must 'take ad equate ac count of how law is un der stood by those liv ing under it ' (2001, 44) . How ever, it 'need not take a stance on whether the par tic i pants are cor rect in their as crip tions of… moral value ' (2001, 69) . In the same way, an ag nos tic study ing the Ro man Cath o lic Mass or an an thro pol o gist study ing a for eign cul ture need not her self mor ally eval u ate the Mass or the commitments of that culture, even to make evaluative judgments about which features are significant or important to investigate.
For a par al lel ar gu ment, con sider Leiter's com ments about John Finnis' claim that:
[T]he eval u a tions of the the o rist him self are an in dis pens able and de ci sive com po nent in the se lec tion or for ma tion of any con cepts for use in de scrip tion of such as pects of hu man affairs as law or le gal or der. For the the o rist can not iden tify the cen tral case of that prac ti cal view point [the in ter nal point of view] which he uses to iden tify the cen tral case of his sub ject-mat ter, un less he de cides what the re quire ments of prac ti cal rea son able ness re ally are (Finnis 1984 , 16: quoted in Leiter 2003 Leiter writes that there is a 'non-se qui tur' in Finnis's argu ment from the ob vi ous claim that eval u a tions by the theo rist are nec es sary to iden tify cen tral cases to the claim that moral eval u a tions, that is, those made from the standpoint of prac ti cal rea son able ness, are re quired (2003, 34) . In other words, Leiter chal lenges Finnis' as ser tion that theo riz ing about law re quires the the o rist to make -in Dickson's ter mi nol ogy-di rectly evaluative judg ments about the phe nom e non un der con sid er ation. Leiter and Dick son argue that non-moral de scrip tive/ex plan a tory the o riz ing is pos si ble. They have opened up log i cal space for non-moral de scrip tive the o riz ing and im plic itly re jected what I have termed the ne ces sity claim that moral eval u a tion is log i cally nec es sary in the o riz ing about the so cial phe nom e non 'law'. Their ar gu ments can be taken as pro vid ing fur ther sup port 68 for the plu ral ism de fended in the last sec tion: mor ally-neutral descriptivism is one of the logical possible strategies open to theorists of law.
III. IS METHODOLOGICAL POSITIVISM DESIRABLE?
Dick son, Leiter and Waluchow ar gue con vinc ingly that the o rists can do with out moral eval u a tion. The ques tion is: should they? Is it al ways de sir able for the the o rist to act as a mor ally-neu tral ob server even of her own prac tices? Why limit the the o rist to a mor ally-neu tral ap proach? This section ad dresses in an ex plor atory man ner four po ten tial argu ments for lim it ing the the o rist to mor ally-neu tral in quiry, that is, to the de scrip tive in quiry. I ar gue that none of these arguments is convincing.
The first rea son for in su lat ing the the o rist from moral argu ment is to pre vent a slip pery slope to sub stan tive non-pos i tiv ism. Per haps, once we al low moral con sid erations in at the meth od olog i cal level, we are led down a slip pery slope to al low ing moral con sid er ations in at the sub stan tive level, e.g. as ul ti mate tests for le gal va lid ity. Both Waluchow and Dick son are positivists not only at the meth od olog i cal level but also at the sub stan tive level. Waluchow de fends in clu sive pos i tiv ism and Dick son defends the pos i tiv ism of Hart and Raz against the chal lenges of Dworkin and Finnis (Waluchow 1994; Dick son 2001) . This sug gests that the com mit ment to meth od olog i cal positivism is required to secure substantive positivism.
The fear that moral the o riz ing at the meth od olog i cal level will lead to sub stan tive pos i tiv ism is un war ranted how ever. Meth od olog i cal pos i tiv ism is a con cep tu ally sep a rate po sition from sub stan tive pos i tiv ism (Perry 2000, 311) Con sider again Dick son's de fense of meth od olog i cal pos i tiv ism. She im plies that from mere 'in di rectly evaluative' de scrip tion of the be hav ior and in ter nal states of the par tic i pants in our le gal prac tice, we can draw sub stan tive con clu sions about the con di tions of le gal va lid ity. She writes that 'of fi cials in a le gal sys tem must re gard them selves as bound in com mon by a rule that is man i fest in their of fi cial prac tice and by means of which they iden tify what counts as valid law -that must be pres ent in or der for a le gal sys tem to ex ist ' (2004, 126) . This seems to be in tended as a state ment of a sub stan tive posi tiv ist the sis that al leg edly fol lows from a de scrip tive/ex plan a tory meth od ol ogy. How ever, sup pose our de scrip tive the o riz ing yielded the re sult that le gal of ficials took them selves to be bound by moral or re li gious precepts. It would seem to fol low from this con clu sion of descrip tive/ex plan a tory the o riz ing that moral and re li gious pre cepts are le git i mate sources of law and hence that pos itiv ism at the substantive level is false. Thus non-moral theorizing could lead to the denial of positivism at the substantive level.
Con versely, moral the o riz ing could lead to the en dorsement of pos i tiv ism at the sub stan tive level. Well-known positivists have em ployed moral ar gu ments in sup port of their po si tion. As Liam Murphy and oth ers have no ticed, Bentham and Hart both con sid ered consequentialist ar guments for pos i tiv ism (e.g. Murphy 2000, 387-8; Perry 2000, 311) . In 'Pos i tiv ism and the Sep a ra tion of Law and Morals', Hart writes that: [If we adopt] an as ser tion that cer tain rules can not be law be cause of their moral in iq uity, we con fuse one of the most pow er ful, be cause it is the sim plest, forms of moral crit icism… [W]hen we have the am ple re sources of plain speech we must not pres ent the moral crit i cism of in sti tu tions as prop o si tions of a dis put able phi los o phy (Hart 1958) .
Murphy an a lyzes this ar gu ment as Hart fol low ing Bentham's lead in re ject ing what the lat ter called 'quietism', namely the po si tion that 'if peo ple think that bad law is not law, they will be less in clined to sub ject what the le gal system pres ents as law…to crit i cal ap praisal' (Murphy 2000, 387-8) . Thus, there is no re quire ment of non-moral le gal the o riz ing at the meth od olog i cal level to safe guard pos i tiv -70 ism at the sub stan tive level. 11 The slip pery slope ar gu ment in fa vor of methodological positivism fails.
A sec ond po ten tial ar gu ment for meth od olog i cal pos i tivism of the de scrip tive va ri ety is that a de scrip tive ap proach of fers a neu tral or ob jec tive and hence un con tro ver sial meth od ol ogy that will yield de ter mi nate an swers at the substan tive level or de ter mi nate truth con di tions for prop o sitions of law. For ex am ple, Stavropoulos em ploys a par al lel with the nat u ral kind externalism de scribed in the pre vi ous sec tion. He ar gues that de ter mi nacy or ob jec tiv ity can be se cured for le gal prop o si tions be cause the se man tics of legal con cepts par al lels that of the se man tics of terms like 'ar thri tis ' (Stavropoulos 1996) . (There are ob jec tive and deter mi nate med i cal clas si fi ca tions that fix the ref er ence and mean ing of 'ar thri tis'). Ob jec tiv ity will be de liv ered by the de scrip tive strat egy how ever only if the op er a tive con cept is de ter mi nate as it is for con cepts that re fer to nat u ral kinds or so cial kinds like 'ar thri tis'. As I noted above, in ju ris dictions in which le gal ex perts have not yet pro nounced on the le gal con cept of mar riage, there will be no de ter mi nate le gal (op er a tive) con cept. Should the le gal con cept cor re spond to the sec u lar op er a tive concept, to one of the different religious operative concepts, or to the target concept that tracks the implicit moral purposes of marriage?
Fur ther in de ter mi nacy arises within de scrip tive/ex plan atory ac counts due to ques tions about which metatheoretical val ues take pri or ity as well as the need to make evaluative judg ments about what is sig nif i cant or im por tant to explain. For ex am ple, con sider two com pet ing the o ries of law -e.g. Aus tin's com mand the ory and Hart's po si tion that a le gal sys tem is com prised of a hi er ar chy of so cial rulesand sup pose that the em pir i cal data is roughly com pat i ble with both. 12 How would de scrip tive/ex plan a tory the o riz ing 71 IN PRAISE OF WISHFUL THINKING 11 Tom Camp bell's ar gu ment for eth i cal pos i tiv ism is an other ex am ple of a moral ar gu ment for sub stan tive pos i tiv ism (Camp bell 1996) .
12 Note that I am sup pos ing just for the sake of ar gu ment that both the o ries fit the em pir i cal data. Dick son claims that in fact Hart's the ory ad ju di cate be tween the two the o ries? The ques tion of which the ory to adopt will have to be re solved by the ap pli ca tion of metatheoretical val ues. Which the ory is sim pler, more unified and so forth? Hart of ten men tions the sim plic ity of Aus tin's the ory of law (e.g. Hart 1994, 51) . Finnis ob serves that an at trac tive fea ture of "the no tions of com mand, po liti cal su pe rior and habit of obe di ence was pre cisely their sim plic ity and def i nite ness" (Finnis 1980, 5) . This sug gests that em ploy ing the value of sim plic ity to break the tie would yield Aus tin's rather than Hart's ver sion of pos i tiv ism. Perry also ob serves that, on the de scrip tive/ex plan a tory approach, dis tin guish ing be tween the two the o ries would require em ploy ing metatheoretical val ues to ar gue that one has su pe rior ex plan a tory power. 13 Hence, it is likely that dif fer ent op er a tive con cepts will be de liv ered by dif fer ent metatheoretical val ues and that there will be the o ret i cal con flict over how metatheoretical val ues should be ranked against each other and over which value should have priority. Adopting metatheoretical values will not eliminate indeterminacy or controversy.
The se lec tion of par a digms and the prob lem of ex trap o lation might also in tro duce in de ter mi nacy into the op er a tive con cept. There are at least two plau si ble can di dates for the ca non i cal ref er ent of our term 'le gal sys tem'. First, there is Hart's ap proach in which the par a digm is the 'mod ern munic i pal le gal sys tem' and hence in cludes the le gal sys tems 72 NATALIE STOLJAR does better on that score. She writes that 'the shift of em pha sis [from com mands to rules] il lu mi nated a whole range of data which was in ad equately dealt with by ear lier ver sions of le gal pos i tiv ism, which, even in their more so phis ti cated man i fes ta tions, of fered "ex ter nal" ac counts of legal phe nom ena ' (Dick son 2001, 24) . 13 In deed it is pre cisely be cause Hart did not en gage in an ar gu ment over which the ory best ex em pli fies su pe rior pre dic tive power that Perry thinks it im plau si ble to at trib ute de scrip tive/ex plan a tory the o riz ing to Hart. He says that Hart does not claim that a the ory such as Aus tin's which de scribes "so cial phe nom ena in purely behavioristic terms and treat[s] the in ter nal point of view as epiphenomenal at best is de fi cient in the sci en tific sense of fail ing to have pre dic tive power" (Perry 2000, 321) .
of Eu ro pean civil law coun tries (Hart 1994) ; sec ondly, there is Dworkin's ap proach in which the par a digm is the An gloAmer i can com mon law le gal sys tem that does not in clude Eu ro pean civil sys tems (Dworkin 1977) . The dif fer ence in the se lec tion of par a digms has had sig nif i cant con sequences for le gal the ory. Since ju di cial de ci sions are an impor tant com po nent of the com mon law sys tem, any de scriptive/ex plan a tory ac count of the par a digm 'An glo-Amer i can com mon law' re quires us to eval u ate data about ad ju di cation as well as the com mon law and moral prin ci ples that in form ad ju di ca tion. When one as sumes that the ref er ent of 'law' is An glo-Amer i can com mon law, it is plau si ble that the moral prin ci ples em ployed by com mon law judges in ad judi ca tion will be among the es sen tial fea tures of the ca non ical referent of 'law' that the the o rist uses to ex trap o late from the lo cal to the gen eral case. It is a short step from here to the con clu sion that moral con sid er ations can con sti tute crite ria of le gal va lid ity for the gen eral case of law.
If I am right, de scrip tive/ex plan a tory the o riz ing about law is likely to be in de ter mi nate first be cause there is no de ter mi nate rank ing of metatheoretical val ues, and secondly be cause there may be more than one plau si ble canon i cal ref er ent of our term 'law'; dif fer ent ref er ents lead to in com pat i ble the o ret i cal ac counts. Mor ally-neu tral the o rizing is un likely to be more de ter mi nate or less con tro ver sial than moral the o riz ing. There is no rea son there fore to prefer meth od olog i cal pos i tiv ism sim ply on the ba sis that it will pro vide a neu tral and de ter mi nate jus ti fi ca tion of a substan tive le gal the ory or a more neutral and determinate justification than would moral theorizing.
A third ar gu ment for meth od olog i cal pos i tiv ism is that it is de sir able or nor ma tively re quired that the the o rist limit her self to de scrip tive/ex plan a tory the o riz ing. Re call that Dick son's de scrip tive strat egy re quires that le gal the o riz ing be 'de scrip tive' not in the sense that it is non-evaluative, but rather in the sense that the the o rist avoid di rect moral eval u a tion of the prac tice. She brings this out us ing an ex -73 am ple of an ag nos tic's de scrip tive/ex plan a tory ac count of a Ro man Cath o lic Mass. Pre cisely be cause she is ag nos tic, she does not seek to take on the per spec tive of the par tic ipants in Cath o lic re li gious prac tices to mor ally eval u ate their com mit ments. It is cer tainly true that the the o rist can in su late her self from the task of moral eval u a tion, and could al ways act qua an thro pol o gist or ag nos tic and never qua par tic i pant in the prac tice. But is it de sir able for the the o rist al ways to be limited to the position of agnostic?
It is ar ti fi cial to claim that some one re flect ing on her own com mu nity's prac tice must al ways limit her self to the role of the ag nos tic. Re call the dis cus sion above of the no tion of mar riage. I sug gested that when the man i fest and op er a tive con cepts con flict, or when the op er a tive con cept is in de termi nate, an ameliorative in quiry might shed light on our sec u lar con cept of mar riage. Are there im plicit moral purposes in our prac tices that jus tify us ing the con cept 'marriage' to de mar cate op po site sex un ions from same sex unions? As a par tic i pant in the prac tice her self, it is nat u ral for the the o rist to em ploy an ameliorative in quiry to work out the mean ing of 'mar riage'; in so do ing the the o rist does not re main 'ag nos tic' but rather eval u ates the moral purposes of mar riage that are im plicit in her prac tices. The same ap plies for the o rists of the con cept of law. When a legal the o rist her self is a par tic i pant in a prac tice, her stance is anal o gous, not to that of an thro pol o gists of ag nos tics, but rather to that of Cath o lic theo lo gians who the o rize about their own prac tice by adopt ing an ameliorative strategy to work out the mean ing of Cath o lic doc trine. In the absence of other ar gu ments -for ex am ple the slip pery slope ar gu ment or the neu tral ity ar gu ment just out lined-the onus of proof is on the pro po nent of de scrip tive/ex plan atory the ory to show that it is de sir able for the the o rist to avoid moral eval u a tion of her prac tice. In deed, when the descrip tive pro ject leads to indeterminacies, it may be that only eval u a tion of the moral purposes implicit in the 74 relevant practices can produce a more resolved account of the concept or phenomenon in question.
Fourth, it is claimed that de scrip tive/ex plan a tory the o rizing is suf fi cient to yield the o ries that are explanatorily ad equate. Dick son claims that mor ally-neu tral, in di rectly evaluative the o riz ing will be explanatorily ad e quate to a social phe nom e non like law. To have explanatory adequacy:
Ju ris pru den tial the o ries must not merely tell us truths, but must tell us truths which il lu mi nate that which is most impor tant about and char ac ter is tic of the phe nom ena un der in ves ti ga tion. More over, in so do ing, those the o ries must be suf fi ciently sen si tive to the way in which those liv ing un der the law re gard it. (Dick son 2001, 25) Dick son's no tion of ex plan a tory ad e quacy as it is ar tic ulated here is vague and open to in ter pre ta tion. What does ex plan a tory ad e quacy re ally re quire? Dick son ac knowl edges that evaluative judg ments will have to be made as to 'what is most im por tant about and char ac ter is tic of the phe nom enon un der in ves ti ga tion' but claims that such judg ments will not in clude moral judg ments. How ever, one might argue that what is most im por tant to ex plain about law is its con nec tion to mo ral ity, and hence any explanatorily ad equate ac count of law re quires moral eval u a tion of the law (Priel 2010, 646) . 14 Fur ther, con sider the re quire ment that in or der to achieve ex plan a tory ad e quacy, a the ory must be 'suf fi ciently sen si tive to the ways those liv ing un der the law re gard it'. Dick son claims that the com mand the o ries endorsed by Bentham and Aus tin do badly on this di men sion of ex plan a tory ad e quacy be cause 'they failed to un der stand law from the in ter nal point of view, i.e. as it is un der stood by those who are sub ject to it and who use it to guide their behaviour ' (2001, 24) . One could take this ar gu ment a step fur ther. Perry points out that the par tic i pants in le gal prac -75 tices are prac ti cal rea son ers or ra tio nal agents and hence will ex pect the law -since it is co er cive-to give them reasons for ac tion that they would not oth er wise have. A co ercive prac tice like law must pro vide par tic i pants with at least min i mal moral rea sons to com ply (Perry 2000, 350) . If this is the case, the the o rist will be un able to give a full expla na tion of the im pact of a par tic u lar set of laws on the ratio nal agents sub ject to them with out ask ing, as ra tio nal agents them selves, whether the rea sons of fered by the system would be per sua sive to them. This will re quire the theo rist to take a stand on the con tent of the rea sons pro vided by the le gal sys tem un der con sid er ation, i.e. to eval u ate whether it in fact pro vides moral rea sons to par tic i pants. In other words, a the o rist may be able to pro vide an even better ac count of 'the way in which those liv ing un der the law re gard it' than that of Hart by eval u at ing di rectly whether the moral rea sons of fered by the law would be persua sive to the ra tio nal agents op er at ing un der it.
CONCLUSION I have at tempted in this pa per to set out some pre lim inary rea sons to re ject meth od olog i cal le gal pos i tiv ism. The ar gu ment does not rely on es tab lish ing the ne ces sity claim that moral eval u a tion is nec es sary for le gal the o riz ing but rather on es tab lish ing the de sir abil ity claim that moral eval u a tion is a valu able com po nent in le gal the o riz ing. I argued in Sec tion I that the ne ces sity claim is false due to con cep tual anal y sis plu ral ism and there fore I agree with pro po nents of the de scrip tive/ex plan a tory ap proach that theirs is a pos si ble meth od ol ogy in le gal the ory (sec tion II). Pro po nents of the de scrip tive/ex plan a tory meth od ol ogy have not shown how ever that it should be the only meth odol ogy adopted to an swer the o ret i cal ques tions about law. I ar gued in Sec tion III that lim it ing the the o rist to the descrip tive/ex plan a tory meth od ol ogy is not de sir able. It does not have the ad van tages that are im plic itly at trib uted to it: 76 it does not se cure sub stan tive pos i tiv ism or avoid the need to re solve the o ret i cal indeterminacies. More over, plac ing restric tions on the o rists to en sure that they keep moral consid er ations out of le gal the o riz ing is not de sir able be cause in so do ing the o ret i cal ques tions we care about are left unanswered.
